From: AIIPOWMIAI@aol.com (Bob Necci)
Subject: POW: Jackson-Vanik
Date: 1998/05/05
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Advocacy And Intelligence Index
For Prisoners Of War/Missing In Action, Inc. ( AIIPOWMIAI )
Bob Necci and Andi Wolos
THE POW/MIA E-MAIL NETWORK (c)
aiiapr28.98a
April 22, 1998
The Jackson-Vanik Amendment:
Normalization of Commercial Relations with Vietnam
and
The POW/MIA Road Map
By Bob Necci
UNDERSTANDING JACKSON-VANIK
The Jackson-Vanik amendment (Section 402, Title IV, Trade Act
of 1974; 19 U.S.C. 2432) is the pivotal element of the normalization
of U.S. commercial relations with Vietnam. This amendment allows for
emerging market economies to be eligible for most-favored-nation
status in trade with the United States. It also allows access to
federal financial facilities based on compliance with free-
emigration requirements as imposed by Jackson-Vanik (J-V).
In its essence, J-V prohibits the restoration of certain
commercial relations with countries that engage in practices
enjoining or severely restricting free emigration of its citizens
and precisely identifies such practices as: (1) abnegating from its
citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, (2) imposing more
than a nominal tax on emigration or documents required for
emigration, (3) imposing more than a nominal tax or charge on a
citizen as a consequence of desire to emigrate to the country of
choice.
The President by Executive action has two options available to
him. He may report to Congress, semiannually, that the listed
country no longer engages in restricted practices or he may
determine that a waiver of prohibition will substantially promote
the objectives of J-V based on having received the country's
assurances that its emigration polices will lead to substantial
progress in implementing those objectives. This is an annually
renewable waiver.
These waivers under Presidential authority must be extended
annually or they expire on July 3rd. The extension is automatic if
the President renews it by June 3rd. The Congress may disapprove it
in its entirety or with respect to individual countries by a joint
resolution of Congress adopted by August 30th.
There also exists the requirement of a bilateral trade
agreement which must be approved and implemented by a joint
resolution of Congress before the applicability of restoration of
relations is concluded.
UNITED STATES-VIETNAM RELATIONS SINCE 1975
Essentially, U.S.-Vietnam diplomatic and economic relations
remained paralyzed for over a decade beginning in 1975 with the
communist victory over Saigon in April 1975 wherein the United
States ended diplomatic relations with Saigon and subjected all
relations with South Vietnam to the same restrictions that already
applied to North Vietnam. The principal restrictions included a
nearly total embargo on all commercial and financial transactions
with Vietnam, and a blocking of all Vietnamese assets in the United
States.
Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords, the Hanoi
government called upon the U.S. to begin discussions on establishing
diplomatic relations and demanded the U.S. fulfill pledged U.S.
postwar aid for Vietnam's reconstruction. These demands were
rejected by the Ford Administration who would not proceed without a
full accounting of American POW/MIAs and a clearer vision of
Vietnam's long-range intentions in Southeast Asia.
The Carter Administration began policy initiatives to improve
relations, but these efforts were frustrated by growing evidence
that the Vietnamese government was deliberately expelling hundred of
thousands of its citizens and was making military preparation for
the invasion of Cambodia. In July 1977, the U.S. proposed that
diplomatic relations be quickly established. This was flatly
rejected by the Vietnamese, nor would they provide information on
U.S. POW/MIAs until the U.S. would provide several billion dollars
in postwar reconstructive aid. They later modified this position and
furnished limited information on MIAs. Obviously, U.S. aid was not
forthcoming.
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REAGAN AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS
The Reagan Administration opposed normal relations with Hanoi
until there was a verified withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from
Cambodia and later modified to include a comprehensive settlement.
The Administration also noted that normalizing relations would
remain difficult until Vietnam cooperated in obtaining the fullest
possible accounting of U.S. personnel listed as POW/MIA.
Following the Presidential delegation in 1987, Vietnam began
returning hundreds of sets of remains. Controversy over U.S.
government handling of the POW/MIA issue prompted the Senate to
initiate a special committee to investigative this question. In
1991, the U.S. welcomed Vietnam's willingness to host a U.S. office
in Hanoi to handle POW/MIA affairs and later eased travel
restrictions on Vietnamese diplomats entering the U.S.
In April 1991, the U.S. laid out a detailed "road map" for
normalization with Vietnam. Phase I began with the October 1991
signing of peace agreement on Cambodia.
Vietnam is to: Sign the Cambodian peace accord and help to
persuade the Phnom Penh regime to sign Take needed steps to resolve
quickly "last known alive" POW Discrepancy cases, live sighting
reports, and return American remains with an eye toward settling the
POW/MIA cases in Indochina in 2 years Allow those Vietnamese
detainees previously affiliated with the U.S. to exit by means of
the Orderly Departure Program
United States is to: Lift 25-mile travel ban on Vietnamese
diplomats in New York Begin bilateral talks on normalizing
diplomatic relations Permit U.S. organized travel to Vietnam
Liberalize U.S. economic relations with Cambodia State
publicly U.S. official concerns regarding genocide in Cambodia
Phase II begins after Phase I and once U.N. peacekeepers are
well established in Cambodia.
Vietnam is to: Continue to support Paris agreement and help
persuade Phnom Penh to continue to support it Continue progress
on POW/MIA issues begun in Phase I
United States is to: Send high-level delegation to Hanoi for
talks on normalization of relations Allow U.S.
telecommunications links with Vietnam Allow signing of U.S.
contracts with Vietnam Allow U.S. commercial transactions meeting
basic human needs in Vietnam Work with others to help Vietnam
eliminate arrears to international financial institutions Allow
U.S. firms to open commercial offices in Vietnam Lift all
restrictions on U.S. non-governmental organization projects in
Vietnam
Phase III begins once U.N. procedures and Cambodian settlement
process are well in place.
Vietnam is to: Continue its support and encourage Phnom Penh's
support of Cambodia peace agreement Withdraw all Vietnamese
forces/military advisers from Cambodia Resolve last known alive
discrepancy cases and repatriate U.S. remains readily available to
Vietnam
United States is to: Open diplomatic liaison office in Hanoi and
invite Vietnam to establish one in Washington Fully lift trade
embargo Support International Financial Institutions aid meeting
basic human needs in Vietnam
Phase IV begins once a U.N.-certified free election takes place
in Cambodia; a Cambodian National Assembly is formed and is writing
a new constitution; demobilization of factional forces specified in
the 1991 accord has occurred; and the objectives of the U.S.-Vietnam
2-year effort to resolve POW/MIA issues have been achieved.
Vietnam is to: [No additional requirements at this stage.]
United States is to: Establish ambassadorial-diplomatic
relations with Vietnam Consider granting most-favored-nation
status to Vietnamese trade Favorably consider International
Financial Institutions assistance for non- basic human needs
projects in Vietnam
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
The Clinton Administration has moved incrementally to establish
more normal U.S. economic, consular, diplomatic and other official
relations with Vietnam. Chronology:
July 2, 1993 - Clinton announces U.S. no longer opposes
international financial institution aid to Vietnam ^ September 13,
1993 - Clinton renews authority to maintain U.S. trade embargo on
Vietnam December 15, 1993 - Clinton eases embargo by allowing U.S.
companies to bid on development projects January 27, 1994 -
Senate votes urging lifting of trade embargo February 3, 1994 -
Trade Embargo lifted May 26, 1994 - U.S. and Vietnam announce
that official liaison offices would be established August 10,
1994 - Congress passed H.R. 4425, which lifted legal restrictions on
aid to Vietnam January 28, 1995 - Bilateral diplomatic and
private property claims settled February 1,1995 - Vietnam opens
consular level liaison office in Washington February 3, 1995 -
United States opens consular level liaison office in Hanoi March 9,
1995 - Treasury Department unblocks accounts in which Vietnam or its
nationals had an interest July 11, 1995 - Clinton announces his
decision to establish ambassadorial level relations with Vietnam
August 6, 1995 - Secretary of State Christopher opens U.S.
Embassy in Vietnam May 23, 1996 - Clinton nominates Peterson as
ambassador to Vietnam May 30, 1996 - Clinton certifies the
Vietnam government was fully cooperating with the United States
January 1, 1997 - The Clinton Administration formally nominates
Peterson as ambassador to Vietnam February 13, 1997 - Peterson's
confirmation hearing March 4, 1997 - Peterson's nomination
passes Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 10, 1997 -
Peterson confirmed as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam May 14, 1997 -
Peterson presents ambassadorial credentials to Vice President Nguyen
Thi Binh May 21, 1997 - Le Van Bang presents ambassadorial
credentials to President Clinton March 4, 1998 - Clinton certifies
The Jackson-Vanik amendment (Section 402, Title IV, Trade Act
of 1974; 19 Vietnam is "fully cooperating in good faith" ^ March
11, 1998 - Clinton signs waiver granting exemption of the Jackson-
Vanik amendment for Vietnam
THE CERTIFICATION
On March 4, 1998, President Clinton certified that Vietnam is
"fully cooperating in good faith." This certification was the last
remaining step to the Executive option of granting the J-V exemption
waiver for Vietnam.
We believe this certification was premature.
On February 25, 1998, in a letter responding to concerns on
Vietnam's cooperation on the POW/MIA issue and the J-V exemption
waiver, President Clinton wrote: " . . . the intelligence community
is preparing a National Intelligence Estimate regarding the extent
of Vietnam's disclosure of information on our missing service
personnel. The results of that estimate will be taken into account
as we continue to advance our agenda with Vietnam on all issues,
including emigration and human rights."
Yet on March 4, 1998, in a Memorandum For The Secretary Of
State, President Clinton stated: "I hereby determine, based on all
information available to the United States Government, that the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is fully cooperating
in good faith with the United States . . ."
The record is very clear. The President made his determination
without benefit of the conclusions of the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) which was ongoing, an Estimate he stated would ". . .
be taken into account . . ."
This presidential action is very troubling.
The President makes a certification and determination on
Vietnamese cooperation, the very scope and purpose for which the NIE
was initiated, and yet does not wait for the final report of this
Estimate (with a tentative completion date of March 30, 1998.)
If the President had received a preliminary report on the NIE,
which bolstered his resolve, surely he would have publicly used it
to support his determination and certification. If the NIE does not
support the President's action, pre-empting its release with his
"fast-track" agenda on increased normalization with Vietnam lessens
the impact of the NIE conclusions.
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
If the findings of the NIE conclude that Vietnam is indeed
"fully cooperating in good faith," then continued opposition to the
President's action would be without merit. If the President's
actions are not supported by the NIE, then our only alternative is
to press our case with Congress.
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Advocacy And Intelligence Index
For Prisoners Of War/Missing In Action, Inc.
1220 Locust Avenue, Bohemia, Long Island, New York 11716-2169 USA
Voice: (1-516) 567-9057
Fax: (1-516) 244-7097
E-mail: AIIPOWMIAI@aol.com (Bob Necci)
andi@earthlink.net (Andi Wolos)
Website: http://www.aiipowmia.com/
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