From: ol6@ornl.gov (B W Moll) Newsgroups: alt.war.vietnam Subject: Paris Peace Accords (was: Re:Kennedy's War in VN) Date: 28 Nov 1994 17:02:20 GMT Organization: Martin Marietta Energy Systems NNTP-Posting-Host: copland.cad.ornl.gov In article 1ob@newsbf01.news.aol.com, awshaight@aol.com (AWShaight) writes: >In article <3al9h0$q7e@stc06.CTD.ORNL.GOV>, ol6@ornl.gov (B W >Moll) writes: > >It is interesting that North Vietnam would "recognize" South Vietnam as a >sovereign state when according to the peace accords NVA troops were >allowed to remain in the south and both south vietnamese and viet cong >were allowed to stake out their own territory. I would doubt that anyone >would view this as any more than a truce. Nixon got the best deal he >thought he could get(he finally got out), Theiu was less than happy, and >I'm sure North Vietnam viewed this as a brief respite before the final >act. No, I believe the end of the war came in 1975. Nixon accomplished no >more than he could have in 1969 when he took office. The Paris Peace accords were indeed not perfect. However it was adequate to ensure the survival of South Vietnam, as long as the United States stood ready to enforce its terms. Indeed, a problem with the agreement was the fact that it did not force North Vietnam to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam. However, several provisions of the treaty mitigated this flaw. North Vietnam was not permitted to send in additional military personnel and agreed to respect the DMZ and the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia. If North Vietnam had fully complied with the treaty, its forces in South Vietnam would be isolated and cut off from new supplies and reinforcements. Still, the United States held no illusions about whether North Vietnam would try to circumvent these terms. In fact, that was President Thieu's greatest objection to the treaty. He had no doubt that Hanoi would use the cease-fire to build up its forces for a renewed assault on his nation, keeping their shipments of additional troops and supplies at a level low enough to avoid provoking an American response. Sadly, he was proved to be correct as it was extremely difficult for either President Nixon or Ford to mobilize support in Congress for a retalitory strike as Hanoi's cease-fire violations were merely a step-up in military shipments before their outright invasion in 1975. During his discussions with President Thieu in January 1973, Nixon seemed to be painfully aware of the fact that the Paris accords were a political necessity for the United States if continued aid would be forthcoming to South Vietnam. Leftists in Congress were ready to vote the United States out of the war if Nixon could not conclude an agreement. If the United States could not conclude an agreement before Congress reconvened, Hanoi was certain to stall the talks again. Indeed, on January 2, 1973 the House Democratic Caucus voted 154 to 75 in favor of cutting off all funds for American military operations in Indochina as soon as arrangements were made for the release of American POW's. In essense, an abject surrender to North Vietnam. It was imperative to the Nixon Administration to conclude an agreement to end the war and restore peace in Vietnam. It was not perfect, but it was impossible by the actions of Congress for the Nixon Administration to negotiate a better one, as Congress was poised to legislate an end to American involvement on the terms of the North Vietnamese communists otherwise. At the time of the peace accords, South Vietnam was in a strong position militarily. A stalemate existed on the battlefield, as the ARVN had an advantage in military strength. Its army fielded over 450,000 troops, about half in combat and half in support units. Its Air Force was about 54,000 in strength, and its Navy about 42,000. In addition, there were 325,000 troops in its Regional Forces and another 200,000 in its Popular Forces. North Vietnam strength stood between 500,000 and 600,000 troops, with about 290,000 in North Vietnam, 70,000 in Laos and 148,000 in Cambodia. Only about 148,000 NVA troops were in South Vietnam, which gave the ARVN about a 4:1 advantage on the battlefield. Two U.S. operations, code-named Enhance and Enhance Plus were undertaken in 1972 to tip the balance of power in Vietnam towards the South Vietnamese before the Paris Peace Accords limited our aid to one-for-one replacements. This included 175mm artillery for three battalions, M48 tanks for two armored battalions, 286 UH1 attack helicopters, 23 CH47 airlift helicopters, 22 AC119K gunships, 28 A1 attack aircraft, 32 C130A cargo aircraft, 90 A37 attack bombers 118 F5A fighter aircraft and 23 EC47 ECM/reconnaissance aircraft. North Vietnam was also supplying its forces in South Vietnam, but our efforts outdistanced Hanoi's by a wide margin. South Vietnam's military advantage extended to all fronts, as the NVA had suffered catastrophic losses during their 1972 offensive. All along the northern front the NVA was pinned down trying to hold on to its gains. Some NVA divisions were below 50% of their authorized strength. In the Central Highlands, where the ARVN was weakest, NVA forces could not advance beyond their limited territorial enclaves and held no significant towns or villages. In the Saigon ara, NVA units were in total dissaray, with many units below 30% of their authorized strength. In the Mekong delta, where 50% of the population of South Vietnam lived, some regular NVA units were below 15% of their authorized strength. Indeed, Hanoi faced a grim outlook as it had lost over 190,000 troops in their 1972 offensive but had gained very little territory. Saigon controlled all significant commerce, all important lines of communication, and all population centers. North Vietnamese sources admitted that South Vietnam ruled over 80% of its territory, and 87% of its population. Communist morale and combat effectiveness were at an all-time low. In January 1969, when the Johnson Administration left office there was no plan on how to end the war. No progress was indicated on the negotiation front in Paris, no comprehensive American peace proposal had even been developed. No plans existed to bring home any of the 550,000 American troops in Vietnam. Indeed, the Johnson Administration had made plans to increase American troop strength. For Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy Vietnam had been a reletively minor irritant. For Lyndon Johnson, the war in Vietnam had destroyed his presidency and was about to destroy the United States. Regards- Brent --- disclaimer: The views represented here are my own. Any similarity between my views and the views of my employer is purely coincidence. . . . I'm not a crook! -- Richard M. Nixon --------------------------------------------------------------------- Brent W. Moll Internet ol6@ornl.gov Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge TN Phone: 615-574-6335 (USA) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------