From: ol6@ornl.gov (B W Moll) Newsgroups: alt.war.vietnam Subject: Leftists in U. S. Congress Who Abandoned Vietnam Date: 21 Nov 1994 18:04:58 GMT Organization: Martin Marietta Energy Systems NNTP-Posting-Host: copland.cad.ornl.gov In article 9411210902162588@vertigo.com, lavaughn.hayes@vertigo.com (Lavaughn Hayes) writes: >BM> There is some debate about seperating the two eras, however I do for a >BM> few specific reasons. In 1973 at the time of the Paris Peace Accords, >BM> North Vietnam officially recognized South Vietnam as an independent >BM> state. IMHO, this act can be seen as the 'end' of the war. > >I find your arguments sufficiently persuasive. > >BM> The weakening of South Vietnam's military forces in 1973 and 1974 by >BM> the failure of the United States Congress to adequately provide the >BM> resources necessary for South Vietnam ... > >Do you have any idea who in the US Congress were the leaders of this effort >to deny SVN the promised aid? I was still in the Army when this was going >on and didn't keep up with it, and this is something which is never men- >tioned in the news media. On January 27th, 1973, almost twenty years after the French had lost the first Vietnam War, we had won the second Vietnam War. The South Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, and the United States signed the peace agreement in Paris that ended the war in a way that won the peace. We had redeemed our pledge to keep South Vietnam free. Now, to keep the peace, we had to take whatever actions were necessary to prevent a third Vietnam War. The U.S. Congress however, proceeded to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Once our troops were out of Vietnam, Congress initiated a total retreat from our committments to the South Vietnamese people. First, Congress destroyed our ability to enforce the peace agreement through legislation prohibiting the use of American military power in Indochina. In the spring of 1973, the United States offered to North Vietnam the opportunity to extend the cease-fire that existed in South Vietnam to Cambodia and Laos. The Paris Accords did not address the vital issue of North Vietnam's use of these nations to ship men and materiel into South Vietham. In the spirit of the accords, _we_ had stopped the bombing of NVA positions on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos, but in violation of the letter of the accords, Hanoi did not withdraw its forces from the country. Now, without the fear of American bombing, over 18,000 trucks and over 70,000 troops moved down the Ho Chi Minh trail in a crash effort to resupply their forces in South Vietnam in direct violation of the Paris accords before the monsoon season began in April 1973. Since the final release of American POW's was not to take place until March 27th, there was reluctance by President Nixon to renew air attacks on the NVA in Laos, and he continued to seek a North Vietnamese compliance with the Paris accords through diplomatic efforts, but by April 1st, Nixon threatened retalitory air strikes unless the NVA cease-fire violations stopped. However, by April when President Nixon spoke of retaliation, a tremor of oppositon rippled through Congrerss, and it was clear that Nixon could no longer muster the Congressional approval necessary to back up his words with strong actions. Leftist senators and congressmen launched a frontal assault against Nixon, initally setting as a target a legislative halt to U.S. bombing in Cambodia, although they soon raised their sights to a prohibition of all direcrt and indirect American military actions in or around Indochina. They also sought to forbid the sending of reconstruction aid to North Vietnam. When they suceeded in both efforts, Congrerss had withdrawn both the carrots and sticks built in to the Paris agreement, and Hanoi as as result had not reason to comply with its terms. Senator Kennedy was a vocal critic of President Nixon's efforts and a principal sponsor of the measure. Kennedy stated that 'if we really want peace in Cambodia, and cease-fire arrangements for all of Indochina, then we should be sending our diplomats to help negotiate these agreements, instead of sending our B52's to bomb.' Ironically, since it was Kennedy's brother who committed the United States to the defense of the free nations of Indochina, _he_ was leading the fight to abandon them. President Nixon vetoed this bill '. . . because of my great concern that the enactment into law of this bill would cripple or destroy the chances for an effective negotiated settlement in Cambodia and the withdrawl of North Vietnamese troops as required by Article 20 of the January 27 Vietnam agreement.' Senator Mike Mansfield, Democratic Senate Majority Leader, then declared it was his intention to 'attach riders to every piece of legislation.' His first target was a continuing resolution that had to be signed to keep the government running. Mansfield stated 'If the President does not want to stop the bombing in Cambodia but does want to stop the government from functioning, that is the President's responsibility.' Thus, on June 30th, President Nixon signed into law the bill containing the bombing cutoff. The bill stated that 'None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act may be expended to support direct or indirect combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam or South Vietnam by United States forces, after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other Act may be expended for such purposes.' Thus, the Congress stripped the President from being able to enforce the Paris Peace Accords, and gave Hanoi's leaders a free hand against South Vietnam. Congress also added further restrictions to President Nixon's ability to enforce the Paris Peace Accords by passing over Nixon's Veto the War Powers Act. This action laid to rest any fears in Hanoi that the United States would act if they invaded South Vietnam again. In January 1973, South Vietnam held a numerical edge on the battlefield. However, the numbers overstated the case. One huge disadvantage operated against Saigon: its forces were on the defensive. All fighting took place in South Vietnam, and no strategic threat exited to Hanoi. This ment that the tactical and strategic advantage passed to Hanoi. Its leaers could choose when, where, and how to attack. Thus, South Vietnam's generals had to spread our their forces to protect the entire nation. Saigon never had much room for error in this perilous game of balance. It had survived the offensive in 1972 through mobility and air power, but the ARVN was short several battalions of what was neeed to turn back a full-strength attack from the NVA. That was why they suffered their early reversals in the spring 1972 NVA invasion. However, the ARVN stabilized the battle by shifting their airborne reserves between the several fronts as circumstances dictated. Then, the South Vietnamese Air Force stepped in once the battle lines stabilized to rip apart the NVA's massed forces. Had South Vietnam not had both mobility and air support, it was questionable whether it could have survived and prevailed against the NVA in their massive 1972 invasion. After the cease-fire, South Vietnam would be secure only as long as North Vietnam was not permitted to recoup its losses. Hanoi would have no difficulty in keeping up the guerrilla threat. Saigon had to devote much of its resources to counter this or lose the countryside. Thus, if Hanoi were allowed to restore its decimated forces along the front lines in the South, Saigon would face the same shortfall in military strength that it did before the offensive in 1972. Indeed, North Vietnam dedicated itself to the task of rebuilding its forces in South Vietnam during 1973. A string of AAA/SAM installations were built to prevent surveillance or attack on their postions by Saigon's Air Force. In the areas they controlled in Quang Tri provience, huge oil-storage tanks were built, along with a paved highway and an oil pipeline south to their headquarters north of Saigon. A modern radio network was established throughout the territory that they occupied, and by January 1974 the NVA had added over 12,000 miles of roads to its logistics network and had reduced by two-thirds the time needed to transport troops in North Vietnam to the front lines over 1,200 miles away in South Vietnam. Also, unhindered by U.S. attacks, immense convoys of over 300 trucks rolled along the Ho Chi Minh trail in broad daylight. Thousands of trucks arrived each week with new stocks of supplies, equipment, and ammunition. New antiaircraft regiments, artillery units, and tank battalions came in as well. North Vietnam's military strength in the South grew ominously. It sent in over 75,000 combat troops, bringing its ranks up to about 170,000. It increased its tank strength 500% to over 500 and upped its number of heavy artillery pieces from 170 to over 250. This buildup demonstrated how important and effective our bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail had been. It also points out how disasterous it was that Congress had prohibited its own military from resuming the bombing of these flagrant North Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire. Within a year of the cease-fire, Hanoi had restored the military position it had held before the 1972 offensive. South Vietnam thus faced a renewed threat of invasion, now without U.S. support. Second, Congress undercut South Vietnam's ability to defend itself, by drastically reducing our military aid. We had promised in the Paris Peace Accords to replace all arms, munitions, and war materiel destroyed or expended by the South Vietnamese forces after the cease-fire. That was a pledge that the antiwar leftist majority in Congress failed to fulfill. Congress cut the level of every aid package for South Vietnam submitted by the Nixon or Ford Administrations and reduced aid rom $2,270 million in FY 73 to $1,010 million in FY 74 and $700 million in FY 95. Senator Kennedy argued that our miliary assistance was 'fueling' the war and that reducing aid to Saigon would bring it to an end, as if South Vietnamese troops were in the North and not the other way around. When Congress cut the aid to South Vietnam, it neglected to slow the flow of Soviet aid to North Vietnam. Inflation compounded the effect of U.S. aid reduction. Estimates of ARVN military requirements, and thus financial needs were worked into the program budget months before the equipment and supplies were actually bought. Prices often skyrocketed in the meantime. In South Vietnam, inflation ran at about 65 percent in 1974, and Saigon needed more money to pay its troops. Prices for military supplies increased an average of 27 percent. Oil cost 400 percent more due to OPEC's 1973 embargo. The Congress, however never adjusted budget prices to compensate for these price increases. Therefore, there was a lot more bang for the buck in the Administration's cost estimates than whatever was delivered to the battlefield. Congress also did not take into account the intensity of the continuing Communist attacks after the cease-fire had taken effect. Stocks of ARVN ammunition totaling 177,000 tons in January 1973 had plummeted to 121,000 tons in May 1974 despite significant restrictions on its use by Saigon. In April 1974, supplies of 105mm howitzer shells were sufficient for only 52 days of fighting, less if the war intensified. About 35% of the ARVN's tanks and about 50% of APC's were idle for lack of spare parts. Stocks of tires, radio batteries and parts for M16 rifles were well below saftey levels. Because of strict fuel conservation rules, only about half of the ARVN's vehicles could be operated. Thus, mobility, the key to its victory in 1972 had vanished. South Vietnamese lives were also put in danger because of South Vietnam's inability to get medical help to casulaties was deteriorating due to a lack of aid. In 1974, stocks of supplies such as blood-collection bags, IV fluids, antibiotics and surgical dressings had all dwindled to very low levels. There were zero balances for about half of all the medical supplies on the inventory lists. No insect repellent was available for soldiers in the malaria-ridden zones of the northern proviences. Shipments into medical supply depots had fallen from about 24,000 tons in March 1973 to about 8,000 tons in May 1974. In September 1974, the Ford Administration sent to Congress a bill for $1,450 million in aid to Saigon. The Congress approved $500 million in actual military assistance. Congress had effectively written off our ally. Within two years the balance of power swung decisively in Hanoi's favor. When the NVA was poised to launch its final offensive in 1975, the ARVN was in its weakest condition in over five years, reeling from the effects of Congressional budget cuts that had strapped it with servere fuel and ammunition shortages. Regards- Brent --- disclaimer: The views represented here are my own. Any similarity between my views and the views of my employer is purely coincidence. . . . I'm not a crook! -- Richard M. Nixon --------------------------------------------------------------------- Brent W. Moll Internet ol6@ornl.gov Oak Ridge National Laboratory Oak Ridge TN Phone: 615-574-6335 (USA) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------